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Abstract— Uniform marginal prices cannot generally support 
competitive equilibrium solutions in markets with non-
convexities and yield schedules’ inconsistency and surplus sub-
optimality effects. Previous work has identified non-convexities 
associated with the generation side of electricity markets and 
proposed a generalized uplift approach to eliminate these effects. 
This paper examines the above issues from the perspective of the 
flexible demand (FD) side. FD non-convexities are identified, 
including its ability to forgo demand activities and minimum 
power levels, and resulting inconsistency and surplus sub-
optimality effects are demonstrated through simple examples. 
Generalized uplift functions for FD participants are proposed, 
including quadratic pricing terms to limit their tendency to 
concentrate at the lowest-priced periods, and binary terms 
associated with their ability to forgo activities. Finally, a new rule 
is proposed for the equitable distribution of the total surplus loss 
among the market participants. These contributions are 
supported by case studies on a market with a day-ahead horizon 
and hourly resolution. 
Keywords—Competitive equilibrium, electricity markets, 
flexible demand, generalized uplifts, surplus sub-optimality. 
I. NOMENCLATURE 
A. Indices and Sets 
ݐ א ܶ Index and set of time periods 
݅ א ܫ Index and set of generators 
݆ א ܬ Index and set of FDs 
ݎ Index of iterations 
࣡௜ Operating constraints set of generator ݅ 
ࣞ௝ Operating constraints set of FD ݆ 
Ξ௜  Profit cutting planes set of generator ݅ 
Ψ௝ Utility cutting planes set of FD ݆ 
B. Variables 
ࣅ Vector of electricity prices ߣ௧ (£/MWh) 
ࢍ࢏ Vector of power outputs ݃௜௧ of generator ݅ (MW) 
࢛࢏ Vector of commitment statuses ݑ௜௧ of generator ݅ 
ࢊ࢐ Vector of power demands ௝݀௧ of FD ݆ (MW) 
ݒ௝ Binary variable expressing whether the activity of FD 
݆ is forgone (ݒ௝ ൌ 0 if it is forgone, ݒ௝ ൌ 1 otherwise) 
࢝࢐ Vector of binary variables ݓ௝௧  expressing whether FD 
݆  is active at ݐ  ( ݓ௝௧ ൌ 1  if it is active, ݓ௝௧ ൌ 0 
otherwise) 
ઢࢻ࢏ࢍ Vector of uplift parameters Δߙ௜௧௚  associated with the 
power output of generator ݅ at ݐ (£/MWh) 
ઢࢉ࢏࢕࢔ Vector of uplift parameters Δܿ௜௧௢௡  associated with the 
“on” commitment status of generator ݅ at ݐ (£/h) 
ઢࢉ࢏࢕ࢌࢌ Vector of uplift parameters Δܿ௜௧௢௙௙  associated with the 
“off” commitment status of generator ݅ at ݐ (£/h) 
ઢࢻ࢐ࢊ Vector of uplift parameters Δߙ௝௧ௗ  associated with the 
power demand of FD ݆ at ݐ (£/MWh) 
ઢࢼ࢐ࢊ Vector of uplift parameters Δߚ௝௧ௗ  associated with the 
square of the power demand of FD ݆ at ݐ (£/MW2h) 
Δߛ௝ௗ Uplift parameter associated with forgoing the activity 
of FD ݆ (£) 
C. Parameters 
ࡰ Vector of total inflexible demands ܦ௧  (MW) 
௝݀௧௠௜௡ Minimum power limit of FD ݆ at ݐ (MW) 
௝݀௧௠௔௫ Maximum power limit of FD ݆ at ݐ (MW) 
ܧ௝ Energy requirement of the activity of FD ݆ (MWh) 
D. Functions 
ܥ௜ Cost function of generator ݅ 
ܤ௝  Benefit function of FD ݆ 
݌ݎ݋௜  Profit function of generator ݅ 
ݑݐ ௝݅ Utility function of FD ݆ 
௜ܷ
௚ Uplift function of generator ݅ 
௝ܷௗ Uplift function of FD ݆ 
II. INTRODUCTION 
Uniform marginal prices cannot generally support 
competitive equilibrium solutions in markets with non-
convexities [1]-[7]. In other words, market participants’ surplus 
maximizing self-schedule given the marginal prices determined 
by the centralized market clearing problem, is not generally 
consistent with the schedule calculated by the latter. In cases of 
such inconsistencies, the centralized schedules yield lower 
surpluses than self-scheduling, with this difference termed as 
surplus loss and the related effect as surplus sub-optimality. 
This effect is not acceptable on the basis of allowing all market 
participants to determine independently their production / 
consumption given the prices, and not by central intervention. 
Previous work has identified non-convexities associated 
with the generation side of electricity markets, including binary 
(on/off) commitment decisions, fixed and start-up/shut-down 
costs, minimum stable generation constraints, and minimum 
up/down times [2]-[7]. As demonstrated in this literature, these 
non-convexities lead to generators’ schedules inconsistency 
and profit sub-optimality effects. 
Furthermore, different market schemes have been proposed 
to address such effects and achieve competitive equilibrium at 
the optimal solution of the centralized problem. After solving 
the initial mixed-integer centralized problem, authors in [2] 
solve a continuous version of the latter, with the binary 
commitment variables set equal to their optimal values. The 
dual variables of these equality constraints yield differentiated 
prices for the generators’ commitment, which along with the 
uniform energy prices support an equilibrium solution. In [3]-
[4], generators experiencing profit sub-optimality receive uplift 
payments that compensate their profit loss, and the electricity 
prices are optimized to minimize the total uplift payments. 
However, approaches in [2]-[4] charge the total 
compensation of profit loss to the (completely inflexible in 
these works) demand side of the market, which is thus treated 
inequitably. To this end, authors in [5]-[7] propose the use of 
generalized uplift functions, which constitute additional 
revenues or payments for the generators. Due to the above 
shortcomings of uniform marginal prices, these functions 
include generator-specific linear and non-linear terms. The 
parameters of these functions along with the electricity prices 
are adjusted to achieve consistency for every generator and an 
equitable distribution of generators’ profit loss compensation 
among the market participants. Considering a single period 
problem, the existence of such differentiated prices achieving 
consistency is proved in [5], while their calculation through an 
optimization problem is outlined in [6]. Since the approach 
followed in [6] is impractical in multi-period problems 
accounting for generators’ time-coupling characteristics, an 
iterative cutting-plane algorithm for the calculation of uplift 
parameters and electricity prices is proposed in [7]. 
The introduction of flexible demand (FD) in power 
systems has attained continuously increasing interest due to its 
significant economic, technical, and environmental benefits 
[8]. In the deregulated environment, the realization of this 
potential is coupled with the integration of FD in electricity 
markets [9]. Authors in [10]-[12] have proposed different 
market clearing mechanisms considering FD participation and 
demonstrated the impact of FD on the market. However, 
previous work has not explored inconsistency and surplus sub-
optimality effects from the perspective of FD. 
This paper identifies non-convexities associated with the 
operation of FD and demonstrates their relation with 
inconsistency and surplus sub-optimality effects. The 
generalized uplift approach and the iterative uplift 
computation algorithm of [5]-[7] are extended to support 
competitive equilibrium solutions under both generation and 
FD participation. Generalized uplift functions for FD 
participants are defined, accounting for both demand forgoing 
and rescheduling potentials, and a new rule is proposed for the 
equitable distribution of the total generators’ profit loss and 
FD utility loss compensation among the market participants. 
These contributions are supported by case studies on a market 
with a day-ahead horizon and hourly resolution. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section III 
derives operational models of FD and formulates the 
centralized market clearing problem under FD participation. 
Section IV identifies FD non-convexities and demonstrates the 
resulting inconsistency and surplus sub-optimality effects 
through simple examples. Section V details the extension of 
the generalized uplift approach and the cutting-plane uplift 
computation algorithm considering both generation and FD 
participation. Section VI presents the examined case study and 
illustrative results. Finally, Section VII concludes this work. 
III. CENTRALIZED MARKET CLEARING UNDER FLEXIBLE 
DEMAND PARTICIPATION 
Based on participants' bids and offers, the market operator 
solves the social welfare maximization problem (1)-(2) to 
determine the clearing schedules  ࣈ࢏כ ؠ ሾࢍ࢏כ, ࢛࢏כሿ;  ׊݅ א
ܫ and ࣒࢐כ ؠ ൣࢊ࢐כ, ݒ௝כ, ࢝࢐כ൧;  ׊݆ א ܬ. A continuous version of (1)-
(2), with the binary variables set equal to their optimal values, 
is solved next to determine the electricity prices ࣅכ (values of 
dual variables associated with constraints (2)). 
max ࣈ࢏א࣡೔; ׊௜אூ
࣒࢐אࣞೕ; ׊௝א௃
 ∑ ܤ௝൫࣒࢐൯௝א௃ െ ∑ ܥ௜ሺࣈ࢏ሻ௜אூ  (1) 
subject to:   ∑ ݃௜௧௜אூ ൌ ܦ௧ ൅ ∑ ௝݀௧௝א௃ ;  ׊ ݐ א ܶ (2) 
In this paper, the generators’ cost functions include 
variable, fixed, start-up and shut-down costs, and their 
operating constraints’ sets include minimum stable and 
maximum generation limits, ramp rates, minimum-up and 
minimum-down times. The analytical formulation of these 
cost functions and constraints’ sets follows the model 
presented in [13] and is not presented here for brevity reasons. 
Regarding FD participants, two different demand 
flexibility potentials are considered in this paper. The first is 
associated with the ability to completely forgo a demand 
activity and the second is associated with the ability to 
reschedule the energy requirements of an activity in time. 
Without loss of generality, it is assumed that each FD 
participant carries out at most one activity over the market 
horizon. In order to account for the potential to forgo an 
activity, the benefit function of FD ݆ is expressed by (3); the 
consumers receive zero benefit if the activity is forgone, or a 
constant benefit ܤ௝଴ otherwise. 
ܤ௝൫࣒࢐൯ ൌ ܤ௝଴ כ ݒ௝ (3) 
The operating constraints set ࣞ௝  of a FD ݆  includes the 
following constraints: 
1. The total energy consumption is zero if the related 
activity is forgone, or equal to the fixed energy requirement of 
the activity otherwise. 
∑ ௝݀௧௧א் כ 1݄ ൌ ݒ௝ כ ܧ௝ (4) 
2. When the FD is active (i.e. its demand is not zero), its 
power demand is bounded by a minimum and a maximum 
power limit. 
ݓ௝௧ כ ௝݀௧௠௜௡ ൑ ௝݀௧ ൑ ݓ௝௧ כ ௝݀௧௠௔௫;  ׊ ݐ א ܶ (5) 
IV. FLEXIBLE DEMAND NON-CONVEXITIES AND IMPACT ON 
CONSISTENCY AND SURPLUS OPTIMALITY 
In a competitive market, market participants act as self-
interested surplus-maximizing entities, given the electricity 
prices and subject to their operating constraints. These self-
scheduling optimization problems for a generator ݅ and a FD ݆ 
are expressed by (6) and (7), and the resulting optimal 
schedules by ࣈ࢏࢙ and ࣒࢐࢙ respectively. 
maxࣈ࢏א࣡೔ሺ݌ݎ݋௜ ؠ ሺࣅሻᇱࢍ࢏ െ ܥ௜ሺࣈ࢏ሻሻ (6) 
max࣒࢐אࣞೕሺݑݐ ௝݅ ؠ ܤ௝൫࣒࢐൯ െ ሺࣅሻᇱࢊ࢐ሻ (7) 
According to Section II, ࣈ࢏࢙  and ࣒࢐࢙  given ࣅכ are not 
generally consistent with ࣈ࢏כ and ࣒࢐כ  respectively. In cases of 
such inconsistencies, ࣈ࢏כ  and ࣒࢐כ  generally entail lower 
surpluses than ࣈ࢏࢙  and ࣒࢐࢙  respectively, with this difference 
termed as surplus loss. The surplus loss for a generator ݅, a FD 
݆ and the total surplus loss are respectively expressed by: 
߂݈݋ݏݏ௜௚ ؠ ݌ݎ݋௜ሺࣅכ, ࣈ࢏࢙ሻ െ ݌ݎ݋௜ሺࣅכ, ࣈ࢏כሻ (8) 
߂݈݋ݏݏ௝ௗ ؠ ݑݐ ௝݅൫ࣅכ, ࣒࢐࢙൯ െ ݑݐ ௝݅൫ࣅכ, ࣒࢐כ൯ (9) 
ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽܮ݋ݏݏ ൌ ∑ ߂݈݋ݏݏ௜௚௜אூ ൅ ∑ ߂݈݋ݏݏ௝ௗ௝א௃  (10) 
Previous work has identified non-convexities associated 
with the generation side, yielding inconsistency and surplus 
sub-optimality effects (Section II). In this section, FD 
participants are examined from the same perspective. The first 
FD non-convexity is associated with the potential to forgo a 
demand activity and is mathematically captured by the binary 
decision variables ݒ௝. A FD will choose to forgo its activity if 
its total utility is negative i.e. the total electricity payments 
incurred by the activity are higher than the benefit ܤ௝଴  it 
derives from the activity, or carry out the activity if its total 
utility is positive. 
The effect of this non-convexity is demonstrated through a 
single-period problem, where the market includes a) a FD ݆ 
with ܧ௝ ൌ 12  MW ௝݀ଵ௠௜௡ ൌ 5  MW, ௝݀ଵ௠௔௫ ൌ 15  MW and 
ܤ௝଴ ൌ 150  £ and b) a generator ݅  with a cost function 
ܥ௜ሺ݃௜௧ሻ ൌ ݃௜௧ଶ  and without any non-convex characteristics. 
Under centralized market clearing, the FD activity is carried 
out since ܤ௝଴  is higher than the generation cost incurred to 
supply this demand (144£), and thus the optimal solution 
involves ݃௜௧כ ൌ ௝݀௧כ ൌ 12 MW and ߣ௧כ ൌ 24 £/MWh. However, 
given this price, the FD would choose to forgo its activity, 
since its payments ( ߣ௧כ כ ௝݀௧כ ൌ 288  £) are higher than its 
benefit ܤ௝଴; therefore, under the centralized solution, the FD 
incurs a utility loss of 138£. 
Even if the potential to forgo a demand activity is 
neglected, FDs still exhibit a non-convex operating 
constraints’ set, since their demand can take the values 
௝݀௧ ൌ 0  and ௝݀௧ ൌ ௝݀௧௠௜௡  but not any value in the range 
ሺ0, ௝݀௧௠௜௡ሻ. A two-period problem is considered here, where the 
market includes a) a FD ݆ with ܧ௝ ൌ 12MWh, ௝݀ଵ௠௜௡ ൌ ௝݀ଶ௠௜௡ ൌ
5 MW and ௝݀ଵ௠௔௫ ൌ ௝݀ଶ௠௔௫ ൌ 15 MW, b) inflexible demands 
with ܦଵ ൌ 10  MW and  ܦଶ ൌ 20  MW and c) the same 
generator ݅  with the previous example. Under centralized 
market clearing, the FD activity is scheduled entirely at ݐ ൌ 1 
in order to flatten as much as possible the total demand profile 
and minimize the total generation costs, and the optimal 
solution involves ௝݀ଵכ ൌ 12  MW, ௝݀ଶכ ൌ 0 MW, ߣଵכ ൌ
44£/MWh and ߣଶכ ൌ 40£/MWh. However, given these prices 
the FD would choose to be scheduled entirely at ݐ ൌ 2 since 
this period exhibits a lower price; therefore, under the 
centralized solution, the FD incurs a utility loss of 48£. 
If the same problem is considered with ௝݀ଵ௠௜௡ ൌ ௝݀ଶ௠௜௡ ൌ 0, 
the optimal centralized solution flattens completely the total 
demand profile with ௝݀ଵכ ൌ 11  MW, ௝݀ଶכ ൌ 1 MW and ߣଵכ ൌ
ߣଶכ ൌ 42 £/MWh. Given these prices, any feasible solution of 
the FD’s self-scheduling problem including its above 
centralized schedule is an optimal one, and therefore the FD 
does not incur utility loss. It can be thus concluded that FDs’ 
non-convexities associated with their ability to forgo activities 
and minimum power levels yield schedules’ inconsistency and 
utility sub-optimality effects. 
V. GENERALIZED UPLIFTS UNDER FLEXIBLE DEMAND 
PARTICIPATION 
A. Formulation of Minimum Generalized Uplift Problem 
A generalized uplift approach is proposed in [5]-[7] to 
eliminate schedules’ inconsistency and profit sub-optimality 
caused by generation non-convexities, and achieve 
competitive equilibrium at the centralized solution. The 
generalized uplift function ௜ܷ
௚  (11) constitutes additional 
revenue (ܷ ൐ 0) or payment (ܷ ൏ 0 ) for generator ݅ , and 
includes a set of generator-specific parameters ∆࣊࢏ࢍ ൌ
ൣઢࢻ࢏ࢍ, ઢࢉ࢏࢕࢔, ઢࢉ࢏࢕ࢌࢌ൧ associated with the power output, the “on” 
commitment status and the “off” commitment status of 
generator ݅ respectively. These parameters are adjusted so that 
generators’ new or augmented self-scheduling is consistent 
with the centralized solution. Along with these parameters, the 
new electricity prices ࣅࡺ faced by the (inflexible) demand are 
adjusted to ensure that the latter contributes at a desired level 
in the compensation of generators’ profit loss. This adjustment 
is carried out through an optimization problem, denoted as the 
minimum generalized uplift problem [7]. 
௜ܷ
௚ሺࣈ࢏, ∆࣊࢏ࢍሻ ൌ ∑ ൣ߂ߙ௜௧௚݃௜௧ ൅ ߂ܿ௜௧௢௡ݑ௜௧ ൅ ߂ܿ௜௧௢௙௙ሺ1 െ ݑ௜௧ሻ൧௧א் (11) 
In the same vein, we propose a generalized uplift function 
௝ܷௗ (12) applying to FD ݆. It includes a set of adjustable FD-
specific parameters ∆࣊࢐ࢊ ൌ ൣࢤࢻ࢐ࢊ, ࢤࢼ࢐ࢊ, ∆ߛ௝ௗ൧ associated with 
the power input, the square of the power input and forgoing 
the activity of FD ݆ respectively. As demonstrated in Section 
VI, the proposed uplift functions provide adequate degrees of 
freedom to achieve consistency for all FDs in the market. 
௝ܷௗ൫࣒࢐, ∆࣊࢐ࢊ൯ ൌ ∆ߛ௝ௗ൫1 െ ݒ௝൯ ൅ ෍ ቂ߂ߙ௝௧ௗ ௝݀௧ ൅ ߂ߚ௝௧ௗ ൫ ௝݀௧൯ଶቃ
௧א்
 
 (12) 
Given the above uplift functions, the augmented self-
scheduling optimization problems involve the maximization of 
the augmented profit of generator ݅  (13) and the augmented 
utility of FD ݆ (14). 
݌ݎ݋௜൫ࣅࡺ, ࣈ࢏, ∆࣊࢏ࢍ൯ ؠ ሺࣅࡺሻᇱࢍ࢏ െ ܥ௜ሺࣈ࢏ሻ ൅ ௜ܷ௚ሺࣈ࢏, ∆࣊࢏ࢍሻ (13) 
ݑݐ ௝݅൫ࣅࡺ, ࣒࢐, ∆࣊࢐ࢊ൯ ؠ ܤ௝൫࣒࢐൯ െ ሺࣅࡺሻᇱࢊ࢐ ൅ ௝ܷௗሺ࣒࢐, ∆࣊࢐ࢊሻ  (14) 
The minimum generalized uplift problem includes the 
following constraints: 
1) The solution of the centralized market clearing problem 
is identical to the solution of the augmented self-scheduling 
problems for all market participants (15)-(16). 
ࣈ࢏כ ൌ ࣈ࢏ࢇ ؠ  arg maxࣈ࢏א࣡೔  ݌ݎ݋௜൫ࣅ
ࡺ, ࣈ࢏, ∆࣊࢏ࢍ൯ ; ׊ ݅ א ܫ (15) 
࣒࢐כ ൌ ࣒࢐ࢇ ؠ  arg max࣒࢐אࣞೕ  ݑݐ ௝݅൫ࣅ
ࡺ, ࣒࢐, ∆࣊࢐ࢊ൯ ; ׊ ݆ א ܬ (16) 
2) Conservation of monetary flow within the market 
should be satisfied, meaning that the total revenues collected 
by the consumers are equal to the total payments paid to the 
generators, including the uplifts (17).  The combination of (17) 
and (2) implies that the sum of uplifts should be zero (18). 
∑ ൣሺࣅࡺሻᇱࢊ࢐כ െ ௝ܷௗ൫࣒࢐כ, ∆࣊࢐ࢊ൯൧௝א௃ ൅ ሺࣅࡺሻᇱࡰ ൌ ∑ ൣሺࣅࡺሻᇱࢍ࢏כ ൅௜אூ
௜ܷ
௚൫ࣈ࢏כ, ∆࣊࢏ࢍ൯൧ (17) 
∑ ௜ܷ௚൫ࣈ࢏כ, ∆࣊࢏ࢍ൯௜אூ ൅ ∑ ௝ܷௗ൫࣒࢐כ, ∆࣊࢐ࢊ൯௝א௃ ൌ 0 (18) 
3) The difference between a participant’s surplus under 
augmented self-scheduling and self-scheduling without uplifts 
determines the contribution of this participant to the 
compensation of the total surplus loss [6]. This contribution is 
expressed by (19), (20), and (21) for generator ݅, FD ݆, and the 
inflexible demand respectively. 
߂ܿ݋݊ݐ௜௚൫ࣅࡺ, ∆࣊࢏ࢍ൯ ؠ ݌ݎ݋௜ሺࣅכ, ࣈ࢏࢙, ૙ሻ െ ݌ݎ݋௜൫ࣅࡺ, ࣈ࢏ࢇ, ∆࣊࢏ࢍ൯ ൒ 0 
 (19) 
߂ܿ݋݊ݐ௝ௗ൫ࣅࡺ, ∆࣊࢐ࢊ൯ ؠ ݑݐ ௝݅൫ࣅכ, ࣒࢐࢙, ૙൯ െ ݑݐ ௝݅൫ࣅࡺ, ࣒࢐ࢇ, ∆࣊࢐ࢊ൯ ൒ 0 
 (20) 
߂ܿ݋݊ݐ௜௡௙ሺࣅࡺሻ ؠ ሺࣅࡺሻᇱࡰ െ ሺࣅכሻᇱࡰ ൒ 0 (21) 
The combination of (2), (8)-(10), (15)-(16) and (19)-(21) 
yields (22), which expresses that the total surplus loss is equal 
to the total compensation contribution by all participants. 
ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽܮ݋ݏݏ ൌ ߂ܿ݋݊ݐ௜௡௙ሺࣅࡺሻ ൅ ∑ ߂ܿ݋݊ݐ௜௚൫ࣅࡺ, ∆࣊࢏ࢍ൯௜אூ ൅
∑ ߂ܿ݋݊ݐ௝ௗ൫ࣅࡺ, ∆࣊࢐ࢊ൯௝א௃  (22) 
Authors in [6] proposed two market rules to achieve an 
equitable distribution of the compensation for the total surplus 
loss among the market participants: a) the total compensation 
is divided equally among generators and inflexible demand  
and b) the ratio between profit under augmented self-
scheduling and self-scheduling without uplifts is set equal for 
all generators. In the context of this paper, the authors believe 
that an equitable compensation distribution between 
generators, FDs and inflexible demand cannot be determined 
unambiguously. However, an extended version of the latter 
market rule is proposed, where the ratio ܴ (0൏ ܴ ൏1) between 
surplus under augmented self-scheduling and self-scheduling 
without uplifts is set equal for all generators, FDs and 
inflexible demand (23)-(25). 
݌ݎ݋௜൫ࣅࡺ, ࣈ࢏ࢇ, ∆࣊࢏ࢍ൯ ൌ ݌ݎ݋௜ሺࣅכ, ࣈ࢏࢙, ૙ሻ כ ܴ; ׊ ݅ א ܫ (23) 
ݑݐ ௝݅൫ࣅࡺ, ࣒࢐ࢇ, ∆࣊࢐ࢊ൯ ൌ ݑݐ ௝݅൫ࣅכ, ࣒࢐࢙, ૙൯ כ ܴ; ׊݆ א ܬ (24) 
ሺࣅכሻᇱࡰ ൌ ሺࣅࡺሻᇱࡰ כ ܴ (25) 
Substituting (23) – (25) into (22) yields: 
 
ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽܮ݋ݏݏᇩᇭᇭᇪᇭᇭᇫ
஺
ൌ
ሺ1 െ ܴሻ כ ൣ∑ ݌ݎ݋௜ሺࣅכ, ࣈ࢏࢙, ૙ሻ௜אூ ൅ ∑ ݑݐ ௝݅൫ࣅכ, ࣒࢐࢙, ૙൯௝א௃ ൧ᇩᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇪᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇫ
஻
൅
ቀଵோ െ 1ቁ כ ሺࣅכሻᇱࡰᇣᇤᇥ
஼
 (26) 
Along with the condition 0 ൏ ܴ ൏ 1, R is calculated as: 
ܴ ൌ ିሺ஺ା஼ି஻ሻାඥሺ஺ା஼ି஻ሻమାସ஻஼ଶ஻  (27) 
Equation (25), along with the assumption that the 
electricity price is uniformly increased across all periods of the 
market horizon [6], fixes the new electricity prices according 
to (28). 
ߣ௧ே ൌ ߣ௧כ ൅
ቀభೃିଵቁ ∑ ఒ೟כ஽೟೟א೅
∑ ஽೟೟א೅ ;  ׊ ݐ א ܶ (28)  
As in [6], the objective function of the minimum 
generalized uplift problem involves the minimization of the 
square norm of uplift parameters (29). The selection of this 
objective function aims to introduce the minimum 
discrimination by the employment of uplifts. 
min∆࣊࢏ࢍ; ׊௜אூ
∆࣊࢐ࢊ; ׊௝א௃
∑ ฮ∆࣊࢏ࢍฮ
ଶ
௜אூ ൅ ∑ ฮ∆࣊࢐ࢊฮଶ௝א௃  (29) 
B. Iterative Computation of Uplift Parameters 
In order to solve the minimum generalized uplift problem, 
the optimal solutions ࣈ࢏ࢇ; ׊ ݅ א ܫ  and ࣒࢐ࢇ; ׊ ݆ א ܬ  of the 
augmented self-scheduling problems need to be analytically 
expressed in terms of the uplift parameters and new electricity 
prices, so as to enforce the equal schedule conditions (15)-
(16). As discussed in [7], such analytical derivations are 
impractical for multi-period market problems accounting for 
participants’ time-coupling properties. In order to address this 
challenge, authors in [7] proposed an iterative cutting-plane 
algorithm for the solution of the minimum generalized uplift 
problem, and proved its convergence and optimality. This 
algorithm iteratively restricts the feasible set of uplift 
parameters and new electricity prices, through the sequential 
generation of profit cutting planes, to impose indirectly 
conditions (15)-(16). In this section, this algorithm is extended 
to compute the uplift parameters of both generation and FD 
participants and includes the following steps: 
(Step 1) The centralized market clearing problem (1)-(2) is 
solved to obtain ࣈ࢏כ; ׊ ݅ א ܫ , ࣒࢐כ; ׊ ݆ א ܬ and ࣅכ . The iteration 
counter is set to zero ݎ ൌ 0, as well as the initial values of the 
uplift parameters ൫∆࣊࢏ࢍ൯
ሾ૙ሿ ൌ ૙ ; ׊ ݅ א ܫ  and ൫∆࣊࢐ࢊ൯ሾ૙ሿ ൌ
૙; ׊ ݆ א ܬ . The sets of generators’ profit and FDs’ utility 
cutting planes are initialized to the entire space of uplift 
parameters Ξ௜ሾ଴ሿ ൌ Թଷ்; ׊ ݅ א ܫ  and Ψ௝ሾ଴ሿ ൌ Թଶ்ାଵ; ׊ ݆ א ܬ . In 
this paper, the new electricity prices ࣅே  are fixed by the 
equitable compensation distribution rule (28), and therefore 
constitute fixed inputs to the remaining steps of the algorithm. 
(Step 2) The augmented self-schedule of each market 
participant given the latest value of the uplift parameters and 
the new electricity prices, is calculated: 
ሺࣈ࢏ࢇሻሾ௥ାଵሿ ൌ arg  maxࣈ࢏א࣡೔ ݌ݎ݋௜ ቀࣅ
ே, ࣈ࢏, ൫∆࣊࢏ࢍ൯
ሾ௥ሿቁ ;  ׊ ݅ א ܫ (30) 
൫࣒࢐ࢇ൯ሾ௥ାଵሿ ൌ arg max࣒࢐אࣞೕ ݑݐ ௝݅ ቀࣅ
ே, ࣒࢐, ൫∆࣊࢐ࢊ൯ሾ௥ሿቁ ;  ׊݆ א ܬ (31) 
(Step 3) If the augmented self-schedule of a generator ݅ or 
a FD ݆ obtained in (Step 2) is different than the respective 
centralized schedule, a new cut is added to the respective 
cutting plane set (34)-(35). In mathematical terms, if: 
ሺࣈ࢏ࢇሻሾ௥ାଵሿ ് ࣈ࢏כ (32) 
൫࣒࢐ࢇ൯ሾ௥ାଵሿ ് ࣒࢐כ (33) 
then respectively (where ߳௚  and ߳ௗ  are strictly positive 
parameters [7]): 
Ξ௜ሾ௥ାଵሿ ൌ Ξ௜ሾ௥ሿ ת ൛∆࣊࢏ࢍ א Թଷ்:   ݌ݎ݋௜൫ࣅࡺ, ሺࣈ࢏ࢇሻሾ௥ାଵሿ, ∆࣊࢏ࢍ൯ ൑
݌ݎ݋௜൫ࣅࡺ, ࣈ࢏כ, ∆࣊࢏ࢍ൯ െ ߳௚ൟ (34) 
Ψ௝ሾ௥ାଵሿ ൌ Ψ௝ሾ௥ሿ ת ቄ∆࣊࢐ࢊ א Թଶ்ାଵ:   ݑݐ ௝݅ ቀࣅࡺ, ൫࣒࢐ࢇ൯
ሾ௥ାଵሿ, ∆࣊࢐ࢊቁ ൑
ݑݐ ௝݅൫ࣅࡺ, ࣒࢐כ, ∆࣊࢐ࢊ൯ െ ߳ௗቅ (35)  
else respectively: 
Ξ௜ሾ௥ାଵሿ ൌ Ξ௜ሾ௥ሿ (36) 
Ψ௝ሾ௥ାଵሿ ൌ Ψ௝ሾ௥ሿ (37) 
(Step 4) If conditions (36)-(37) are satisfied for every 
participant, the algorithm terminates. If not, a new set of trial 
uplift parameters ൫∆࣊࢏ࢍ൯
ሾ࢘ା૚ሿ and ൫∆࣊࢐ࢊ൯ሾ࢘ା૚ሿ  is calculated 
through the solution of problem (29) subject to the monetary 
flow conservation constraint (18), the equitable compensation 
distribution constraints (23)-(24) and (28), the constraints of 
the cutting plane sets (38)-(39), and constraints (40) ensuring 
that the objective function of FDs’ augmented self-scheduling 
problems (31) is bounded. The iteration counter is then 
incremented by 1 and the algorithm returns to (Step 2). 
∆࣊࢏ࢍ א Ξ௜ሾ௥ାଵሿ;  ׊ ݅ א ܫ (38) 
∆࣊࢐ࢊ א Ψ௝ሾ௥ାଵሿ;  ׊ ݆ א ܬ (39) 
Δߚ௝௧ௗ ൏ 0; ׊ ݆ א ܬ, ׊ ݐ א ܶ (40) 
VI. CASE STUDY 
The examined case study involves the application of the 
proposed generalized uplift approach to a market with a daily 
horizon and hourly resolution, using the optimization software 
FICOTM Xpress v7.7 [14]. The market includes 7 generation 
participants, whose fixed costs ܽ௜ , linear ܾ௜  and quadratic ܿ௜ 
parameters of their variable cost functions, start-up ܥ௜௨  and 
shut-down ܥ௜ௗ  costs, minimum stable ݃௜௠௜௡  and maximum ݃௜௠௔௫  generation limits, ramp rates ܴܴ௜  (identical rates 
assumed for ramp-up and ramp-down), minimum-up ܷ ௜ܶ  and 
minimum-down ܦ ௜ܶ  times, and initial commitment status ݑ௜଴ 
and output ݃௜଴ are given in Table I. At the beginning of ݐ ൌ 1, 
generators with ݑ௜଴ ൌ 1 and ݑ௜଴ ൌ 0 are assumed to be on and 
off for ܷ ௜ܶ  and ܦ ௜ܶ  hours respectively. 
TABLE I.  GENERATION PARTICIPANTS’ CHARACTERISTICS 
Gen ࢏ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
ࢇ࢏ (£/h) 18,431 17,005 13,755 9,930 9,900 8,570 7,530 
࢈࢏ (£/MWh) 5.5 30 35 60 80 95 100 
ࢉ࢏ (£/MW2h) 0.0002 0.0007 0.0010 0.0064 0.0070 0.0082 0.0098
࡯࢏࢛ (£) 4,000,000 325,000 142,500 72,000 55,000 31,000 11,200
࡯࢏ࢊ (£) 800,000 28,500 18,500 14,400 12,000 10,000 8,400 
ࢍ࢏࢓࢏࢔ (MW) 3,292 2,880 1,512 667 650 288 275 
ࢍ࢏࢓ࢇ࢞ (MW) 6,584 5,760 3,781 3,335 3,252 2,880 2,748 
ࡾࡾ࢏ (MW/h) 1,317 1,152 1,512 1,334 1,951 1,728 2,198 
ࢁࢀ࢏ (h) 24 20 16 10 8 5 4 
ࡰࢀ࢏ (h) 24 20 16 10 8 5 4 
࢛࢏૙ 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
ࢍ࢏૙ (MW) 5,070 4,435 2,912 2,568 2,504 0 0 
 
Furthermore, the market includes 8 FD participants able to 
forgo and reschedule their demand activities, with parameters 
given in Table II. The minimum and maximum power limits 
of each FD are assumed identical at every hour of their 
scheduling period (denoted by ௝݀௠௜௡  and ௝݀௠௔௫  respectively) 
and zero at the rest of the hours. FD participants 1-4 can be 
scheduled during night/morning hours, representing domestic 
FD, and FD participants 5-8 during midday hours, 
representing commercial/industrial FD. 
Under centralized market clearing, domestic and 
commercial/industrial FDs fill the inflexible demand’s night 
and midday valleys respectively, flattening significantly the 
total demand profile, as shown on Fig. 1. However, these 
valleys and subsequently the centralized prices at these 
periods are not completely flattened, due to the minimum 
power levels of FD participants. 
 
TABLE II.  FD PARTICIPANTS’ CHARACTERISTICS 
FD ࢐ 1 2 3 4 
࡮࢐૙ (£ mil) 0.187 0.486 0.311 0.334 
ࡱ࢐ (MWh) 2,677 3,241 2,071 2,228 
ࢊ࢐࢓࢏࢔ (MW) 1,328 1,620 497 980 
ࢊ࢐࢓ࢇ࢞ (MW) 2,142 2,593 1,657 1,782 
Scheduling period (h) 18 - 8 18 - 7 19 - 8 19 – 9 
FD ࢐ 5 6 7 8 
࡮࢐૙ (£ mil) 0.352 0.197 0.175 0.113 
ࡱ࢐ (MWh) 3,119 1,315 1,166 958 
ࢊ࢐࢓࢏࢔ (MW) 1,273 421 583 479 
ࢊ࢐࢓ࢇ࢞ (MW) 2,495 1,052 932 767 
Scheduling period (h) 9 - 17 10 - 17 9 - 17 11 - 18 
 
 
Fig. 1. Inflexible demand and total demand under centralized market 
clearing. 
As illustrated in Fig. 2, FD participants’ self-scheduling 
given the centralized prices and no uplifts is not consistent 
with the centralized schedule. These inconsistencies are 
associated with both demand flexibility potentials. 
Considering the ability to reschedule their activities, under 
self-scheduling, FDs concentrate at the lowest-priced hours 
within their scheduling period, which is not consistent with the 
centralized solution involving an as-flat-as-possible total 
demand profile. 
 
Fig. 2. Comparison of total FD under centralized market clearing, self-
scheduling and augmented-self scheduling. 
Considering the ability to forgo their demand activities, FD 
5 would choose to do so under self-scheduling, since its 
benefit ܤହ଴ ൌ £0.352 mil is lower than the lowest payment it 
could achieve by optimally scheduling within its feasible 
scheduling period (£0.356 mil). On the other hand, under 
centralized clearing, its activity is not forgone since ܤହ଴  is 
higher than the extra generation cost incurred to supply the 
demand of this activity (£0.341 mil). The opposite case holds 
for FD 1. Under self-scheduling, the latter would choose to 
carry out its activity, since its benefit ܤଵ଴ ൌ £0.187 mil is 
higher than the lowest payment it could achieve by optimally 
scheduling its activity (£0.174 mil). Under centralized clearing 
however, its demand activity is forgone since ܤଵ଴ is lower than 
the extra generation cost incurred to satisfy its demand 
(£0.199 mil). 
As illustrated in Fig. 3, the generation side also exhibits 
inconsistencies between centralized scheduling and self-
scheduling, associated with generation non-convexities 
explored in [2]-[7]. All the above inconsistencies are 
translated into surplus losses, demonstrated in Table III. In 
order to eliminate these inconsistency and surplus sub-
optimality effects, the proposed generalized uplift approach 
was applied. The parameter ܴ  associated with the equitable 
distribution of the total surplus loss compensation was 
calculated as ܴ ൌ 99.91%  according to (27). The new 
electricity prices are then calculated according to (28) as 
ߣ௧ே ൌ ߣ௧כ ൅ 0.098 £; ׊ ݐ א ܶ. 
 
Fig. 3. Comparison of total generation under centralized market clearing, 
self-scheduling and augmented-self scheduling. 
The uplift parameters’ iterative computation algorithm was 
then applied with ߳௚ ൌ ߳ௗ ൌ 0.01 £  in (34)-(35), and 
converged after 57 iterations and 197 seconds of 
computational time on a computer, with a 6-core, 3.47 GHz 
Intel(R) Xeon(R) X5690 processor and 192GB of RAM. As 
illustrated in Fig. 2 and 3, FD and generation participants’ 
augmented self-scheduling given the values of the uplift 
parameters calculated by the iterative algorithm and the new 
electricity prices, is consistent with the centralized schedule. 
As shown in Table III, the total compensation contribution by 
all participants exactly cancels out the total surplus loss. 
 
Table IV presents the required types of uplift parameters 
(types without which the iterative algorithm cannot converge 
to a consistent augmented self-schedule) for the different FD 
participants. FD 1 requires only the uplift parameter Δߛ௝ௗ , 
since its demand activity is forgone under centralized clearing 
and uplifts associated with its power demand cannot have any 
effect in achieving consistency. On the other hand, the rest of 
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the FDs do not require Δߛ௝ௗ  since their activities are not 
forgone under centralized clearing, and Δߛ௝ௗ cannot have any 
effect in achieving consistency. For these FDs, uplifts 
parameters associated with the square of their demand are 
required to limit their tendency to concentrate at the lowest-
priced periods. 
TABLE IV. REQUIRED UPLIFT PARAMETERS OF FD PARTICIPANTS 
FD ࢐ Required uplift parameters 
1 Δߛ௝ௗ 
2 ઢࢻ࢐ࢊ and ઢࢼ࢐ࢊ 
3 ઢࢻ࢐ࢊ and ઢࢼ࢐ࢊ 
4 ઢࢻ࢐ࢊ and ઢࢼ࢐ࢊ 
5 ઢࢻ࢐ࢊ and ઢࢼ࢐ࢊ 
6 ઢࢻ࢐ࢊ and ઢࢼ࢐ࢊ 
7 ઢࢻ࢐ࢊ and ઢࢼ࢐ࢊ 
8 ઢࢻ࢐ࢊ and ઢࢼ࢐ࢊ 
 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper explores the inability of uniform marginal 
prices in supporting competitive equilibrium solutions from 
the perspective of the FD side of electricity markets. Non-
convexities associated with the operation of FD are identified, 
including its ability to forgo load processes and minimum 
power levels. The relation of these non-convexities with 
schedules’ inconsistency and surplus sub-optimality effects 
are demonstrated through simple one- and two-time period 
examples and a larger case study with a day-ahead horizon 
and hourly resolution.  
The generalized uplift approach of [5]-[7] is extended to 
support competitive equilibrium solutions under both 
generation and FD participation by defining suitable 
generalized uplift functions for FD participants. These include 
quadratic pricing terms to limit the tendency of FD to 
concentrate at the lowest-priced periods and binary terms 
associated with their ability to forgo demand activities. 
Finally, a new rule is proposed for the equitable distribution of 
the total surplus loss among the market participants, setting 
the ratio between surpluses under self-scheduling with uplifts 
and without uplifts equal for all participants.  
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TABLE III. CASE STUDY RESULTS 
Market 
Participants Centralized surplus (£) Self-scheduling surplus (£) 
Augmented self- 
scheduling surplus (£) Surplus loss (£) 
Contribution to 
surplus loss (£) 
Generator ݅ 
1 14,420,186  14,420,186 14,406,600 0 13,587 
2 8,871,427  8,871,427 8,863,090 0 8,337 
3 5,400,546  5,400,546 5,395,470 0 5,076 
4 1,592,630  1,592,630 1,591,130 0 1,500 
5 467,944  467,944 467,505 0 439 
6 73,702  77,087 77,015 3,385  72 
7 13,977  20,415 20,396 6,438  19 
FD ݆ 
1 0  13,806 13,793 13,806  13 
2 256,123  275,834 275,575 19,712  259 
3 158,256  182,246 182,074 23,990  172 
4 187,218  191,067 190,888 3,849  179 
5 -6,229  0 0 6,229  0 
6 46,008  47,183 47,139 1,175  44 
7 41,532  41,763 41,723 231  39 
8 3,268  3,672 3,668 404  3 
Inflexible demand 52,629,406  52,629,406 52,678,920 0  49,514 
Total    79,221 79,221 
